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Abstract 
 
A key issue in the design of land use policy is how to integrate information about 
spatially variable biophysical and economic conditions into a cost-effective conservation plan.  
Using common biophysical scoring methods, in combination with economic data and simple 
optimization methods, we illustrate how one can identify a set of priority land parcels for 
conservation investment.  We also demonstrate a way in which conservation agencies can 
incorporate concerns about biophysical thresholds in the identification of their priority land 
parcels.  We apply these methods using Geographic Information System data from a New York 
conservation easement acquisition initiative for water quality protection. 
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I.  Introduction 
Concerns over the effect of private land use on the supply of environmental amenities 
have led to an increasing global reliance on conservation contracting initiatives [Ferraro 2001a].  
The term “conservation contracting” describes the contractual transfer of payments from one 
party (e.g., government) to another (e.g., landowner) in exchange for land use practices that 
contribute to the supply of an environmental amenity (e.g., biodiversity, water quality).  
Examples of conservation contracts include easements and short-term conservation leases.  A 
key issue in the design of conservation contracting initiatives, like any conservation policy, is 
how to integrate information about spatially variable biophysical and economic conditions into a 
cost-effective conservation plan. 
Much of the previous work on targeting scarce conservation funds in heterogeneous 
environments has focused on the conservation of biological diversity.  Targeting approaches 
favored by biological scientists and conservationists emphasize the environmental amenities that 
a given land unit produces, while often ignoring the costs of acquiring those amenities.  For 
example, Dobson et al. [1997] found that endangered species in the United States were 
concentrated spatially and suggested that conservationists focus their efforts on a small number 
of geographic areas.  Ando et al. [1998] responded by pointing out that variability in economic 
factors was just as important as ecological variability in efficient species conservation:  an 
approach that considered both economic and ecological variability could cost less than one-sixth 
the cost of the approach that only considers ecological variability.  A similar debate developed 
over targeting ecosystem conservation investments at the global scale [Mittermeir et al. 1998; 
Balmford et al. 2000].  Other studies by economists have also demonstrated the importance of 
integrating biophysical and economic data:  Polasky et al. [2001], for the case of species 
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conservation in Oregon, and Babcock et al. [1996, 1997], for the case of the Conservation 
Reserve Program. 
 This paper adds to the existing literature in several ways.   First, the analysis focuses on 
an increasingly common, but little studied, conservation initiative:  conservation contracting for 
water quality objectives.  The results of our empirical analysis support previous empirical work 
suggesting that the failure to incorporate cost data in conservation investment decisions can lead 
to large efficiency losses.  Moreover, studies of cost-efficient targeting [e.g., Ando et al.; 
Polasky; Babcock et al. 1996] have tended to focus on a single biophysical attribute (e.g., species 
absence or presence, erodibility of soil, distance to water).  A narrow focus on a single attribute, 
however, fails to consider the full range of biophysical attributes that are critical to the supply of 
an environmental amenity.  Most conservation initiatives, like the U.S. Conservation Reserve 
Program [USDA 1999] or World Wildlife Fund’s Global 200 initiative [Olson et al. 2000], 
identify multiple biophysical attributes or amenities of interest.  In this study, we consider the 
case of multiple biophysical attributes, a case that easily generalizes to multiple amenities. 
In the context of habitat protection targeting, Prendergast et al. [1999] noted that field 
practitioners and policymakers rarely use the tools and results that have been developed in the 
academic literature.  In large part, the tools and results are not adopted because they are not 
developed and applied with the objectives and approaches of practitioners and policymakers in 
mind.  In the empirical application of this paper, we use data available to decision-makers and 
consider explicitly the actual approaches used by decision-makers in the field.  We also approach 
the problem at the geographic scale at which decisions are being made; i.e., individual parcels 
rather than large administrative districts or GIS polygons on the landscape. 
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Unlike previous work, we recognize that there is often little agreement about the 
appropriate way to estimate the environmental benefits provided by a single parcel and thus use 
multiple methods to guide the empirical analysis.  Finally, there is increasing scientific 
information that suggests biophysical thresholds are important when designing conservation 
initiatives (e.g., a riparian buffer has little effect on water quality unless it achieves a minimum 
size).  Few economic analyses, however, have incorporated such thresholds [Farzin 1996; Wu et 
al. 2000; Bulte and van Kooten 2001].  We demonstrate how simple linking constraints in the 
optimization problem can be used to model the effect of biophysical thresholds on decisions.  In 
the empirical analysis, we compare the conservation contract portfolios selected with and 
without threshold constraints. 
In the next section, we introduce the case study for the empirical analysis.  In section III, 
we characterize the data and introduce the optimization model.  In section IV, we present the 
results of the empirical analysis.  In section V, we adapt the model of Section III to incorporate 
thresholds, and in Section VI, we consider the effects that thresholds have on the selection of the 
optimal conservation contract portfolio. 
 
II.  Case Study:  Lake Skaneateles Watershed Program 
The use of conservation contracts to achieve water quality objectives is becoming an 
increasingly popular policy tool [Johnson et al. 2001].  For example, the New York City 
Watershed Management Plan will spend $250 million on conservation contracting with private 
landowners in the Catskill-Delaware watershed over the next ten years to protect the City’s water 
supply and maintain its filtration waiver from the Environmental Protection Agency [NRC 2000: 
213-239].  Examples of other contracting initiatives for water quality include North Carolina’s 
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$30 million Clean Water Management Trust Fund, Massachusetts’s $80 million dollar effort to 
acquire riparian land to protect Boston’s Wachusett Reservoir, and Costa Rica’s $16 million per 
year effort to secure conservation contracts in, among other areas, the watersheds of municipal 
water supplies and hydroelectric dams. 
In particular, scientists and policymakers have identified the establishment of vegetated 
riparian zones that protect surface waters from inputs of nutrients, pesticides, eroded soil and 
pathogens as an important policy for improving water quality [Tilman et al. 2001].  One such 
riparian buffer acquisition initiative is currently underway in upstate New York.  The City of 
Syracuse (population 163,860) obtains its drinking water from Lake Skaneateles, which is 
located outside of the City’s regulatory jurisdiction.  The lake is 16 miles long, less than one-
mile wide on average, and has a 60 square mile watershed that covers three counties, seven 
townships and one village.  The population of the watershed is about 5000 residents, 
concentrated largely in the northern half of the lake where the City’s intakes pipes are located.  
Land use is mainly a mix of forest (40 percent) and agricultural land (48 percent), on which 
cropping and dairy farming are most common. 
The water from the lake is of exceptionally high quality and the City, using only 
disinfection by chlorination, meets drinking water standards without coagulation or filtration.1  In 
recent years, however, the City has come under increasing pressure to consider filtration in order 
to satisfy the provisions of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Surface Water 
Treatment Rule.  In 1994, the City signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the New 
York State Department of Health that allows the City to avoid filtering water from the lake.  The 
MOA requires that the City commit to a long-term watershed management program to reduce 
                                                 
1 An estimated 20-65 million Americans drink unfiltered surface water (DeZyane 1990), including citizens in the 
cities of New York, Boston and San Francisco. 
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pathogen, chemical, nutrient and sediment loading into the lake.  An important part of the 
management program is a conservation easement acquisition program through which up to $5 
million will be spent over the next seven years (2001-2008) to secure easements on privately 
owned riparian parcels.  By securing easements on riparian buffers in the watershed, the City 
hopes to avoid, or delay, the estimated $60-$70 million cost of a new filtration plant.  The City 
wants to allocate its limited budget across the watershed in a way that will have the greatest 
effect on maintaining and improving water quality in the lake [Meyers et al. 1998].   
In the analysis, we focus on prioritizing the acquisition of easements from an available 
population of 202 riparian parcels in the upper watershed of Lake Skaneateles (see Figure 1).  
Biophysical and economic data on these parcels were obtained from the Geographic Information 
Systems database of the City of Syracuse’s Department of Water.  The southwestern end of the 
lake is protected public land and is thus excluded from the analysis.  Data on parcels in the 
southeastern end of the lake were not available at the time of analysis, but because these parcels 
are far from the City’s intake pipes, excluding them will have only minor effects on the final 
results. 
 
III.  Case Study:  data and model 
We assume that each riparian parcel in the watershed, when protected by an easement, 
generates environmental benefits, bi, to the City of Syracuse at a cost of ci + ti, where ci 
represents the reservation price of the landowner for accepting an easement on his or her 
property and ti is the transaction cost associated with creating and monitoring a contract.  The 
unit of analysis is the parcel, and each parcel is assumed to be homogenous.  In other words, 
each acre in the parcel is equally as valuable, whether measured for environmental benefits or for 
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productive uses.  These are the same assumptions used by the City of Syracuse in its easement 
acquisition program.  
 
Benefit Data 
The City wishes to reduce sediment, chemical, pathogen and nutrient loading into its 
water supply.  Sophisticated hydrological models, however, are not available for the Lake 
Skaneateles watershed.  To measure the contribution of each parcel to the City’s water quality 
objectives, the City’s Department of Water convened a scientific panel to help it develop a 
parcel-scoring system based on known land attributes in the watershed [Myers et al 1998].  The 
panel developed two potential systems: an interval-scale scoring equation and a ratio-scale 
scoring equation.  The equations, which are described in the appendix, assign a score to each 
parcel; the higher the score, the higher the benefit from easement acquisition.  Two other 
common parcel-scoring methods, the categorical scoring system (similar to that used by the U.S. 
Conservation Reserve Program) and the Parcel-Pollutant-Weighting (PPW) equation [Azzaino et 
al. 2002], are also used in the empirical analysis and are described in the appendix.   
All four benefit-measuring methods generate parcel scores either from weighted linear 
functions of the attributes or by assignment of points to each parcel based on its biophysical 
attributes or land uses.  Such scoring methods are quite common in the academic literature [e.g., 
Voogd 1983; Lemunyon and Gilbert 1993], in federal agency guidelines [e.g., USFWS 1982; 
Terrell et al. 1982; Allen 1983; McMahon 1983; Allen and Hoffman 1984; FDEP 1999], in water 
quality protection initiatives [e.g., Smith et al. 1995; Rowles and Sitlinger 1999; MDC 1999; 
FDEP 2000], and in the multi-billion dollar conservation efforts of the U.S. Conservation 
Reserve Program [Feather et al. 1998], land trusts [e.g., The Nature Conservancy; Master 1991], 
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international habitat protection groups [e.g., World Wildlife Fund; Olson et al. 2000], national 
wildlife protection initiatives [e.g., Partners in Flight; Carter et al. 1999], and farmland protection 
initiatives (e.g., American Farmland Trust).   
In the absence of sophisticated hydrological models for the Skaneateles watershed, one is 
unable to determine which of the four parcel scoring methods is best.2  If there is positive 
correlation among the different scoring methods (which one would expect if they are all 
attempting to measure the same amenity), a simple approach to prioritizing easement acquisition 
would be to identify the optimal buffer portfolios selected under several scoring methods and 
then identify a set of “high-priority” parcels that includes only parcels found in every portfolio 
(i.e., parcels that each optimal portfolio has in common across the parcel-scoring methods).  We 
apply this approach in section IV.  As one can see in Table 1, the (Spearman) correlations among 
the parcel scores assigned by each scoring method are strongly positive. 
 
Scoring Method Interval-Scale Ratio-Scale Categorical PPW 
Interval-Scale 1    
Ratio-Scale 0.96 1   
Categorical 0.94 0.92 1  
PPW 0.75 0.81 0.77 1 
      
      Table 1 – Correlations Among Parcel Scores by Scoring Method 
 
                                                 
2 Even if sophisticated models existed for estimating sediment, chemical, pathogen and nutrient loading, one would 
have to somehow combine these measures to derive a measure of “water quality” benefits from an easement on a 
given parcel. 
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Cost Data 
 A regional appraising company estimated that easements around Lake Skaneateles would 
typically cost between 40 percent and 60 percent of the assessed land value of a parcel [Gardner 
2000].  In our analysis, we use 50 percent.  A change in the percentage would affect only the 
number of parcels that can be acquired for a given budget, not the order in which the parcels are 
acquired.  There were not enough observations on sales of properties with easements in the 
region to estimate a hedonic equation of easement costs.  Based on transaction cost information 
from the Finger Lakes Land Trust, which operates in the region, we also assume that there is a 
transaction cost of $5000/easement.  Varying the transaction cost from $2500 to $12,500 did not 
generate dramatic changes in the parcel rankings.3 
 
Optimal Easement Portfolio Selection Problem 
The easement acquisition program of the City of Syracuse can be viewed as a linear 
optimization problem: 
..
max
ts
ep
i
iipi
∑
          [1] 
∑ ≤+
i
iii Dtcp )(          [2]
 
10 ≤≤ ip           [3] 
where  
pi =   Share of parcel i under conservation contract (pi = 1 if parcel is fully contracted) 
ei =  Environmental benefit score for parcel i (a scalar) 
ci =  Contract cost for parcel i (private opportunity cost of conservation) 
ti =   Transaction costs for a contract on parcel i (e.g., legal fees, monitoring) 
D =   Contracting agency’s budget  
                                                 
3  The exceptions were small, inexpensive parcels for which a change in transaction costs can have a large relative 
effect on easement cost. 
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This approach is equivalent to ranking parcels from highest to lowest based on their e/c 
ratio and accepting contracts until the budget is exhausted.  Thus a conservation practitioner can 
solve this problem regardless of whether or not he or she has knowledge of programming 
techniques.  Other characteristics of this targeting formulation are covered in the appendix. 
The City of Syracuse, however, did not formulate its approach to easement acquisition in 
the manner of expressions [1] - [3].  Like many conservation initiatives [e.g., Mittermeir et al. 
1998], the City planned to allocate its funds by ranking parcels from the highest score, ei, to the 
lowest and acquiring easements until the budget was exhausted.  In this approach, there is a 
critical level of environmental benefit, e , for which all parcels with ei >e  are contracted.  If 
partial parcel contracting is permitted, a portion of a single parcel with eei =  will be contracted 
until the budget is exhausted (the marginal parcel); i.e.,  
 
eewhenp i
B
i >= 1          [4] 
eewhenp i
B
i <= 0          [5] 
ee
ii
B
e
B
e
B
e
tc
epD
pwhere
eewhenp
+
−=
=∈
∑
]1,0[
       [6] 
  
 The City’s prioritization formulation ignores the opportunity costs of contracted parcels 
and, as suggested by previous empirical analyses (see references in Introduction), its portfolio for 
any given budget will generate lower benefit scores than the portfolio generated from the 
formulation of expressions [1]-[3]; how much lower is an empirical question. 
 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
The City plans to spend $1-$2.5 million dollars and then evaluate whether further 
easement acquisitions are required.  We therefore solve the optimal easement portfolio problem 
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under each scoring method for budgets of D = $1 million and D = $2.5 million.  The portfolios 
are presented spatially in Figures 2 - 9. 
In Table 2, for each benefit-scoring method, we compare the percent of total 
environmental benefits available in the watershed that are secured by the optimal portfolio (i.e., 
∑∑
==
202
1
202
1
*
i
i
i
ii eep ) to the percent of total environmental benefits available in the watershed that are 
secured under the method that ignores opportunity costs and allocates funds based on benefit 
scores alone (i.e., ∑∑
==
202
1
202
1
*
i
i
i
ii
B eep ).  Consistent with previous research, we observe large 
efficiency losses associated with ignoring costs in the funding allocation decision.  For a budget 
of $1 million, the benefit-only approach achieves 16 to 42 percent of what the optimal approach 
achieves; for a budget of $2.5 million, it achieves 36 to 65 percent of what the optimal approach 
achieves.  The large efficiency gains from using the approach in expressions [1]-[3] rather than 
the approach in expressions [4]-[6] derive from the moderate positive correlation between benefit 
(ei) and cost (ci) measures and the greater relative heterogeneity of costs compared with that of 
benefits [Ferraro 2002]. 
Using the formulation that integrates benefit and cost data is clearly beneficial, but as one 
can see in Figures 2-5, each scoring method generates a different “optimal” portfolio.  As 
mentioned in the previous section, one way to proceed would be to identify the parcels that are 
selected for acquisition under all four scoring methods. These parcels might be regarded as "high 
priority" for an easement acquisition program because they were included in all four optimal 
buffers.  Such an approach would fit well with the City of Syracuse’s approach to easement 
acquisition.  Although the City has estimated that it might spend up to $5 million for easement 
acquisition, it plans to begin acquiring easements sequentially and periodically evaluate whether 
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or not more easements will need to be acquired (L. Myers, pers. comm. 2000).  Thus the City 
wants to know with which parcels it should begin its acquisition efforts.  The set of “high 
priority” parcels would be a reasonable place to start.  For any given available budget, one can 
identify a set of priority parcels that exhausts the budget by changing the value of D under which 
the optimal buffers are derived. 
 
 D = $1 million D=$2.5 million 
Scoring 
Method 
Acquisition 
Method 
% of Total Watershed 
Benefits ( ∑∑
==
202
1
202
1 i
i
i
ii eep ) 
% of Total Watershed 
Benefits ( ∑∑
==
202
1
202
1 i
i
i
ii eep ) 
Optimal 31% 62%  
Interval-Scale 
Ignoring Costs 8% 22% 
Optimal 37% 72%  
Ratio-Scale 
Ignoring Costs 15% 41% 
Optimal 31% 61%  
Categorical 
Ignoring Costs 5% 26% 
Optimal 39% 72%  
PPW 
Ignoring Costs 9% 47% 
 
Table 2 – Portfolio Performance when Opportunity Costs are Ignored 
 
For example, solving for the portfolios when D = $1 million, 11 parcels are found in each 
of the four optimal buffer solutions and these easements can be acquired for $210,900.  Solving 
for the portfolios when D = $2.5 million, 46 parcels are found in each of the four optimal buffer 
solutions and these easements can be acquired for $1,445,150.  Table 3 demonstrates how well 
the “high priority” set of parcels performs compared to the optimal portfolios chosen under the 
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four scoring equations when D = $210,900 and D = $1,445,150.  For example, the high-priority 
portfolio, were its parcels to be scored according to the interval-scale scoring equation, achieves 
92% of the benefits that are achieved by the optimal portfolio derived under the formulation in 
expressions [1]-[3] at D = $1,445,150.  The data in Table 3 suggest that even if one of the 
scoring equations were the “true” measure of parcel benefits, the City of Syracuse would not lose 
a substantial amount of efficiency by selecting the “high priority” portfolio of parcels. 
 
Percentage of Total Benefits Achieved by Optimal Portfolio 
Budget Interval-Scale Ratio-Scale Categorical PPW 
$210,900 72% 82% 78% 82% 
$1,445,150 92% 79% 82% 92% 
          
         Table 3 – High-Priority Portfolio Performance Under Four Parcel-Scoring Methods 
 
 
V. Thresholds: concepts and problem formulation 
The emphasis on parcel-level attributes in the analysis above may be inappropriate if 
there exist thresholds of riparian buffer area below which one can expect little, if any, water 
quality protection.  The importance of biophysical thresholds in conservation policy design has 
been noted in a variety of contexts, including endangered species conservation [Shaffer 1981; 
Lande 1987; Wu et al. 2000] and water quality protection [Schueler 1994a, 1995; Zoner and 
Limitz 1994; Wang et al. 1997, 2000], but few economic land use analyses have incorporated 
biophysical thresholds [Farzin 1996; Wu et al. 2000; Bulte and van Kooten 2001].  Ignoring 
threshold effects, particularly when the available budget is small, may result in a substantial loss 
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of environmental benefits.  In such a context, interventions will be scattered over the landscape 
and funding levels in any given target area may be inadequate to reach the threshold needed to 
maintain current water quality levels or to achieve significant environmental improvements.   
In an empirical study, Wang et al. [1997] found that (1) indicators of water quality were 
negatively correlated with the amount of agricultural land in the entire watershed and in a 100-
meter-wide buffer along streams;4 and (2) the relationship between agricultural land and water 
quality was nonlinear – a substantial decline in water quality occurred after agricultural land use 
exceeded 50%.  With more intensive agricultural use or urban uses, the threshold value 
decreased to between 10% and 20%. 
A recent EPA [1999] report noted that “thresholds for a decline in water quality can take 
the form of size and amount of riparian buffer zones.  Condition of riparian zones and changes in 
percent of buffer areas can indicate a decline in water quality due to soil erosion, sediment 
loading, and contaminant runoff.”  However, there are no general rules of thumb that have been 
developed specifically for riparian areas, and thus the empirical analysis below is intended to 
demonstrate a simple way in which one can incorporate biophysical thresholds into the 
formulation in expressions [1]-[3], rather than to claim that such thresholds exist in the Lake 
Skaneateles watershed. 
The Lake Skaneateles upper watershed is made up of 16 sub-watersheds, or catchments.  
The City has determined that each easement will be designed to secure a 100-foot-wide riparian 
buffer along the entire stream length of the property.  We examine the effect of imposing a 
threshold requirement on the area of 100-foot-wide riparian buffer in a given catchment.  
Empirically, we examine the threshold at three levels: 50%, 80% and 90% of the available 
riparian buffer in the catchment.  For example, if there is a 50% threshold, no water quality 
                                                 
4  Correlations were generally stronger, however, for the entire watershed than for the buffer. 
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benefits can be achieved in a catchment through conservation contracting unless at least 50% of 
the available 100-foot-wide riparian buffer is protected through easements. 
 
Optimal Easement Portfolio Selection with Thresholds 
A watershed is made up of j = 1,…, N sub-watersheds, or catchments.  A conservation 
agent has $D to spend on conservation contracts and wants to allocate these funds to maximize 
environmental benefits.  Conservation contracts are used to secure easements on 100-foot-wide 
riparian buffers.  The number of acres in a 100-foot-wide riparian buffer on the ith parcel in the 
jth catchment is designated as b ji.  In order to receive any environmental benefits from contracts 
in the jth catchment, the conservation agent must contract for at least B j acres of the available 
100-foot-wide riparian buffer in the catchment.  The optimal riparian buffer contract portfolio, in 
the presence of threshold constraints, is the solution to the following problem: 
..
max
1,
ts
ep
N
j i
j
i
j
i
Yp jji
∑∑
=           [7] 
Dcp
N
j i
j
i
j
i ≤∑∑
=1
         [8] 
NjYMbp
i
jj
i
j
i ,....,2,1=≤∑
NjYBbp
i
jjj
i
j
i ,....,2,1=≥∑
      [9] 
       [10] 
}1,0{];1,0[ =∈ jj Yp          [11] 
where 
 
p ji = Parcel i in catchment j; p ji ∈ [0,1] (p ji = 1 if parcel is fully contracted). 
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Y j  = Presence or absence of contracting in catchment j; Y j = {0,1} (Y j  = 1 if there is 
contracting in catchment j). 
e ji = Environmental benefit score of parcel i in catchment j. 
b ji = Acres of 100-foot-wide riparian buffer in parcel i in catchment j. 
c ji = Contract cost for parcel i in catchment j (includes transaction costs) 
B j = Minimum acres of 100-foot-wide buffer that must be secured in catchment j for any 
benefits to be obtained from contracts in that catchment (i.e., the threshold). 
M =  A very large number (= total riparian exposure of the Skaneateles Lake Watershed in feet). 
 
Thus a decision-maker must now select not only the parcels on which to establish a 
conservation contract but also the catchments in which to establish contracts.  The problem 
remains linear in the objective and constraints and thus is easily solved with standard linear 
programming packages (e.g., a practitioner could use Excel’s Solver algorithm to solve the 
problem).  The problem is not restricted to one threshold constraint; for example, one might want 
to add a threshold corresponding to a specific percentage of the drainage area in a catchment that 
must be buffered if there are to be any benefits from easements in the catchment. 
 
VI. Thresholds: results 
As in section IV, we solve the optimal easement portfolio problem under each scoring 
method for budgets of D = $1 million and D = $2.5 million.  The solutions are presented 
spatially in Figures 6-11 for the PPW scoring method.  As one would expect, threshold 
constraints result in spatial concentration of contracts on the landscape.  Table 3 presents the 
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percentage of parcels in the buffer portfolio derived using expressions [7]-[11] that were also 
found in the optimal portfolio derived without threshold constraints (expressions [1]-[3]). 
 
  D = $1 million D = $2.5 million 
Threshold None 50% 80% 90% None 50% 80% 90%
Interval-Scale 100% 75% 65% 75% 100% 94% 89% 78% 
Ratio-Scale 100% 92% 71% 58% 100% 97% 87% 78% 
Categorical 100% 80% 71% 68% 100% 93% 89% 85% 
PPW 100% 85% 55% 44% 100% 92% 83% 77% 
Table 3 – Percentage of Parcels in Optimal Portfolio under Threshold Constraints that are 
found in Original (No-threshold) Portfolio 
 
For a given scoring method, the spatial effect of thresholds on the optimal contract 
portfolio is generally greatest at low budget levels and high thresholds.  For example, using the 
PPW scoring method with a budget of $1 million and a threshold of 50%, 85% of the parcels in 
the new threshold-constrained portfolio are also in the original optimal portfolio derived without 
threshold constraints.  When the threshold is increased to 90%, only 44% of the parcels in the 
optimal portfolio are also found in the original portfolio.  At a threshold of 50%, a larger budget 
of $2.5 million increases the overlap to 92%.  There are, however, anomalies, such as the greater 
overlap at a 90% threshold than at an 80% threshold under the interval-scoring method and a $1 
million budget.  Such anomalies can result because, as the threshold increases, the number of 
acquired parcels, in comparison to the original, no-threshold portfolio, may increase or decrease 
non-monotonically. 
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 To examine the efficiency losses that arise when a conservation agency ignores threshold 
constraints when acquiring contracts, we compare the portfolio scores generated under the 
optimization formulation of expressions [1]-[3], which ignores thresholds, and the optimization 
formulation of expressions [7]-[11], which incorporates thresholds.  If the threshold constraint is 
not met in a catchment, contracts in that catchment yield no water quality benefits.  The results 
are presented in Table 4.  The efficiency losses associated with ignoring thresholds are 
substantial, particularly at low budget levels and high thresholds.  For example, under a $1 
million budget and an 80% threshold requirement, the portfolio derived without considering the 
threshold constraints achieves zero benefits under three of the four scoring methods.  A lower 
threshold at 50% improves the portfolio’s performance a little, but it still achieves only 24% - 
59% of what the portfolio derived under explicit threshold constraints can achieve. 
 
 D = $1 million D=$2.5 million 
% of Total Watershed 
Benefits Achieved 
Under Each Threshold 
% of Total Watershed 
Benefits Achieved 
Under Each Threshold 
Scoring 
Method 
Acquisition 
Method 
50% 80% 90% 50% 80% 90% 
Optimal 28% 26% 25% 61% 56% 55%  
Interval-Scale Ignoring 
Thresholds 
17% 0% 0% 49% 33% 8% 
Optimal 36% 33% 31% 72% 68% 62%  
Ratio-Scale Ignoring 
Thresholds 
8% 0% 0% 67% 44% 31% 
Optimal 28% 26% 25% 60% 56% 54%  
Categorical Ignoring 
Thresholds 
16% 0% 0% 45% 38% 37% 
Optimal 38% 33% 26% 72% 68% 60%  
PPW Ignoring 
Thresholds 
11% 3% 0% 67% 9% 0% 
Table 4 – Portfolio Performance when Thresholds are Ignored 
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 The efficiency losses are even more substantial when one compares the portfolio scores 
achieved under the optimization formulation in expression [7]-[11], which recognizes 
opportunity costs and threshold constraints, with the portfolio scores achieved under the benefit-
ranking formulation in expressions [4]-[7], which ignores opportunity costs and threshold 
constraints.  The results of this comparison are presented in Table 5.  With a budget of $1 
million, the City of Syracuse would likely generate no environmental benefits if it were to 
acquire easements based on parcel scores alone. 
 
 D = $1 million D=$2.5 million 
% of Total Watershed 
Benefits Achieved 
Under Each Threshold 
% of Total Watershed 
Benefits Achieved 
Under Each Threshold 
Scoring 
Method 
Acquisition 
Method 
50% 80% 90% 50% 80% 90% 
Optimal 28% 26% 25% 61% 56% 55%  
Interval-Scale Ignoring 
Costs & 
Thresholds 
0% 0% 0% 15% 5% 0% 
Optimal 36% 33% 31% 72% 68% 62%  
Ratio-Scale Ignoring 
Costs & 
Thresholds 
0% 0% 0% 22% 6% 0% 
Optimal 28% 26% 25% 60% 56% 54%  
Categorical Ignoring 
Costs & 
Thresholds 
0% 0% 0% 23% 3% 0% 
Optimal 38% 33% 26% 72% 68% 60%  
PPW Ignoring 
Costs & 
Thresholds 
6% 0% 0% 17% 9% 0% 
Table 5 – Portfolio Performance when Opportunity Costs and Thresholds are Ignored 
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 Of course, the practitioner still faces the problem of choosing among the different optimal 
portfolios identified under each scoring rule.  The practitioner could try the “high-priority” 
approach of section IV and focus on parcels that are found in the solution of each scoring 
method, but the portfolios chosen through this approach will not necessarily achieve the 
thresholds in each catchment.  In the Lake Skaneateles case, the “high priority” portfolio of 
parcels selected from the optimal buffers when D = $2.5 million would come quite close to 
satisfying the threshold requirements.  In the 50% threshold scenario, the high-priority portfolio 
(cost = $1.52 million) spans 10 catchments, of which 4 exceed the required buffer-area threshold, 
3 are less than 7% below the threshold, 2 are less than 19% below the threshold and 1 is less than 
45% below the threshold.  In the 80% threshold scenario, the high-priority portfolio (cost = 
$1.22 million) spans 5 catchments, of which 2 exceed the threshold and 3 are less than 8% below 
the threshold.  In the 90% threshold scenario, the high-priority portfolio (cost = $1.67 million) 
spans 4 catchments, of which 2 exceed the threshold and 2 are less than 3% below the threshold.  
By increasing the budget or thresholds under which the contract portfolios are chosen, a 
practitioner is more likely to derive a high-priority set of parcels that comes close to meeting the 
required thresholds, although the degree to which this method is successful will be case specific. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
 Policymakers and conservation practitioners throughout the world seek flexible tools that 
permit the integration of biophysical and economic data into cost-effective conservation plans.  
In this paper, we demonstrate a way in which conservation agencies can integrate spatially 
variable biophysical and economic data in the absence of sophisticated biophysical modeling.  
Using common biophysical scoring methods, in combination with economic data and simple 
 19 
 
optimization methods, we illustrate how one can identify a set of priority land parcels for 
contracting.  In an empirical application, we use data from a Geographic Information System 
(GIS) to identify a set of priority land parcels for a riparian buffer contracting initiative in upstate 
New York.  In this empirical application, we use data available to decision-makers, explicitly 
consider actual approaches used by decision-makers, and approach the problem at the geographic 
scale at which decisions are being made.  We also demonstrate a way in which conservation 
agencies can incorporate concerns about biophysical thresholds in their decisionmaking.  The 
results corroborate previous empirical work suggesting that the failure to consider economic data 
in environmental investment decisions can lead to large losses in efficiency.  We demonstrate 
that the potential efficiency losses associated with ignoring biological thresholds are also large.   
Integrating biophysical and economic data is particularly important in the context of 
watershed conservation for three reasons:  (1) the level of environmental amenities and the costs 
of obtaining the amenities are likely to be positively correlated (e.g., conservation on large 
parcels with extensive waterfront and located near infrastructure are likely to be important for 
water quality objectives but are also likely to be expensive), (2) in rapidly developing 
watersheds, the relative spatial variability of conservation contract costs is likely to be greater 
than the relative spatial variability of conservation benefits, and (3) uncoordinated efforts to 
establish riparian buffers across the watershed are likely to lead to little or no water quality 
benefits.  All of these factors indicate that if practitioners fail to integrate the available 
biophysical and economic data, the currently popular approaches to conservation contracting for 
watershed protection may achieve far fewer environmental benefits than expected. 
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Appendix 
 
 A1.  Interval-Scale Scoring Equation 
 The interval-scale scoring equation developed by the City of Syracuse is: 
Environmental Benefit Score (EBS) = 0.20 Acreage + 0.20 Priority Zone  
+ 0.25 (Distance to Intake)-1 + 0.25 Acres of Hydrologically Sensitive Land  
+ 0.10 Stream Length 
The attribute Distance to Intake measures the planametric distance from the geometric center of 
the parcel to a point exactly midway between the City’s two water intake pipes.  The closer to 
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the pipes, the more desirable is the parcel of land. Priority Zone is a categorical variable, 
converted to a numeric scale, that captures the development potential and land use intensity of 
the zone in which a parcel is found.  Stream Length is the length of the stream frontage in each 
parcel, and Acres of Hydrologically Sensitive Land includes hydric soils, steeply sloped soil, 
frequently flooded soils and wetlands.  The higher the parcel score (EBS), the more desirable the 
parcel is for water quality protection.  In order that parcel attributes can be meaningfully 
compared to each other and that the units of measurement do not affect the scores, each attribute 
is scaled so that the least-favorable observed value generates a score of zero and the most-
favorable observed value generates a score of one.  For example, the smallest parcel in the data 
set was 0.17 acres, and thus this parcel received a standardized score of zero for the acreage 
attribute.  The largest parcel was 136 acres and thus received a standardized score of one for the 
acreage attribute.  Intermediate values receive a standardized score based on the relative position 
between the high and low values: 
 
ii
iij
ij MINMAX
MINOBS
ScoreScaleInterval −
−=−        
The standardized score of attribute i for parcel j, called an Interval-Scale Score, derives from 
subtracting the minimum observed value for the attribute from the observed value and dividing 
this number by the difference between the maximum and minimum values for attribute i.  
 
A2.  Ratio-Scale Scoring Equation 
The ratio-scale scoring equation uses the attributes found in the interval-scale equation, 
but its form and normalization differs:   
Environmental Benefit Score (EBS) = 0.27 Acreage + 0.27 Priority Zone  
- 0.27 Distance to Intake  + 0.33 Acres of Hydrologically Sensitive Land   
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+  0.13 Stream Length         
Excluding the Distance to Intake weight, all the weights sum to one.  Each parcel is then 
penalized for its distance from the intake (represented by a negative coefficient on Distance to 
Intake).  All parcel scores are assumed to be greater than or equal to zero (a parcel that generates 
a negative score from the ratio-scale scoring function is scored as zero).  Each attribute is scaled 
so that the most-favorable observed value generates a score of one and every other parcel is 
compared to that parcel; i.e., for the jth parcel and the ith attribute, 
 
i
ij
ij MAX
OBS
ScoreScaleRatio =−   
 
A3.  Categorical Scoring Equation 
The categorical scoring equation is similar to what the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
uses in its Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  For each parcel, the CRP scoring system 
assigns points to a parcel’s attributes.  The total amount of points achievable for each attribute is 
determined by relative weights (e.g., up to 10 points can be awarded for proximity to wetlands 
and up to 15 points can be awarded for endangered species habitat).  The categorical scoring 
equation applied in this paper uses a similar point-scoring system for each land attribute listed in 
the interval-scale scoring equation.  We separate each attribute into three or four categories (e.g., 
0-10 acres, 11-50 acres, 50+ acres) and allow up to 300 total points to be allocated to each 
parcel.  The maximum amount of points possible for each attribute is determined by the same 
weights used in the interval-scale scoring equation. 
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 A4.  Parcel-Pollutant-Weighting Model 
The Parcel-Pollutant-Weighting Model is based on the approaches used by the New York 
State Department of Health [1999] and Hermans [1999] and is developed and explained in 
Azzaino et al. [2002].  We summarize the model briefly.  Each parcel is assigned a land-use 
classification based on GIS data collected from New York’s Real Property database.  Based on 
this classification, the biophysical attributes of the land parcel (e.g., drainage area, distance to 
intake) and the results of a published water quality study [New York State Department of Health 
1999], each parcel’s potential loading of phosphorus and pathogens is assessed qualitatively. 
This qualitative assessment is then assigned an index number ranging from 10, for a qualitative 
assessment of “high,” to 3.33, for a qualitative assessment of “low.” If a parcel is acquired for 
the riparian buffer easement, a percentage reduction in pollutant loading is assumed, based on the 
current qualitative assessment and data in Hermans [1999: 136].  Equal weights are used on 
reductions in pathogens and phosphorous loadings. 
 
A.5  Easement Acquisition Problem – additional characteristics 
 Recall that the choice variables are pi =  parcel i (pi∈ [0,1]; pi = 1 if parcel is fully 
contracted) and the parameters are:  ei  =  Environmental Benefit Score (EBS) for parcel i, ci = 
Contract cost for parcel i (easement value), ti =  Transaction cost for contracting parcel i (e.g., 
lawyer fees, monitoring), and D  =  Contracting agency budget.  The maximization problem is 
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,,, 21
ii
i
iii
i
ii
p
pptcpDepL
i
−+++−+= ∑∑ µµλµµλ        [A1] 
One can interpret λ* as a shadow value at the optimum denoting the increase in 
environmental quality associated with an increase in the budget constraint.  When one allows 
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partial parcel contracting, a positive shadow value is generated for all budgets less than the total 
contract value of all available parcels. 
 Complementary slackness requires that: 
   (parcel is contracted)         [A2] )(1 ** iiii tcewhenp +>= λ
)(0 ** iiii tcewhenp +<= λ             [A3] 
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In other words, if one unit in parcel i is valuable enough to be acquired, every other unit 
in parcel i is good enough to be contracted (by the parcel homogeneity assumption).  One parcel, 
pi*λ, may end up with a partial contract because budget constraints prevent contracting on every 
acre in the parcel. The shadow value, λ* > 0, is the threshold ratio of environmental benefits to 
contract cost (eλi/cλi) that indicates which parcels are contracted and which are not.  One also 
knows that 0
*
<∂
∂
D
λ  and that 1/λ* is the unit price of the environmental amenity (i.e., a unit of 
environmental benefit score) if there existed a uniform-price market for water quality in the Lake 
Skaneateles watershed.  In such a market, the City of Syracuse would pay (1/λ*) Σ p1e1 for its 
contracted land portfolio.  Because there is no such market and the City of Syracuse acts as a 
discriminating monopsonist, the City reaps a surplus of (1/λ*) Σ p1e1 – D . 
One could change the above problem to a binary specification that only allows for full 
parcel contracting (i.e., no partial contracting allowed; see Azzaino et al. [2002] for an example).  
With a probing procedure, the model is not difficult to solve even for hundreds of parcels.  When 
partial contracting is not allowed, one typically obtains two results:  (1) the budget is not 
exhausted at the optimum and thus the shadow value of a unit of environmental benefit at the 
optimum is zero; and (2) the solution includes small parcels with low environmental benefits 
simply because there is money available and better parcels are not affordable.  Since partial 
contracting is a potential choice to decision-makers, the non-binary specification will generally 
be preferable.
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